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 14 
In many social species, group members cooperate to defend a communal home range. Fighting in 15 
between-group conflicts carries an opportunity cost, a risk of injury or death, and the possibility of 16 
exploitation by free-riding group members. As a result, it is rare that all group members fight in a given 17 
between-group conflict, and individual participation in range defence is often highly variable. Thus, to 18 
understand the patterns of behaviour observed at the group level, we must first understand the causes of 19 
within- and between-individual variability. Although sex differences have been well studied, our 20 
understanding of the relative importance of the various mechanisms promoting between-group 21 
aggression within a sex is limited. We observed the participation of 22 male vervet monkeys, 22 
Chlorocebus aethiops pygerythrus, in 126 between-group conflicts, and then partitioned aggressive acts 23 
according to the context in which they occurred. Using this approach, we found evidence that two 24 
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mechanisms drive male between-group aggression and, therefore, that individual variability is in part 25 
driven by the multiple selective benefits of participation. First, males that were likely to have sired 26 
offspring tended to exhibit defensive aggression and were more active when infants were present in the 27 
group, suggesting they fight to defend probable offspring. Second, males were more likely to support 28 
females in initiating between-group aggression just prior to, and during, the mating season. Female 29 
vervet monkeys are able to exert female choice and males that frequently supported female instigators 30 
tended to enjoy the highest mating success. These results indicate that males probably use between-31 
group aggression to improve their reputation with choosy females and subsequently maximize their 32 
mating success. Our findings indicate that a greater understanding of the evolutionary mechanisms 33 
promoting cooperative home range defence can be gained if we consider the context in which acts of 34 
between-group aggression occur.  35 
 36 
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In a diverse array of social species, group members cooperate during between-group (BG) conflicts to 41 
defend access to space, mating opportunities, offspring or limiting resources such as food, water and 42 
shelter (Boydston, Morelli, & Holekamp, 2001; Hölldobler, 1981; Manson et al., 1991; Mares, Young, 43 
& Clutton-Brock, 2012; Mosser & Packer, 2009; R. W. Wrangham, 1980). Fighting in BG conflicts is 44 
costly because participation carries an opportunity cost, a risk of injury or death, and a risk of being 45 
exploited by free-riding group members (Nunn & Lewis, 2001). Home range defence creates a public 46 
good, where all group members benefit from the access to defended resources regardless of whether they 47 
contributed to range defence or not. Because individuals that do not participate in home range defence 48 
gain the greatest net benefits, selection favours a cheating strategy, and home range defence suffers from 49 
a collective action problem (Nunn & Lewis, 2001; Olson, 1965; Willems, Hellriegel, & van Schaik, 50 
2013). This problem is avoided when group members are highly related and therefore can gain indirect 51 
fitness benefits from cooperating with group members (Nunn & Lewis, 2001), as in cooperative breeders 52 
and eusocial insects. However, even in species in which participation in BG conflicts appears to be 53 
collective, individual participation is often highly variable and it is rare that all group members are 54 
active (Bonanni, Valsecchi, & Natoli, 2010; Boydston et al., 2001; Carlson, 1986; Heinsohn & Packer, 55 
1995; Kitchen, 2006; Nunn & Deaner, 2004; Zhao & Tan, 2011). Thus, it is often the case that BG 56 
aggression is not truly a collective action involving all members of a social group, but is rather a ‘joint 57 
action’ by a subset of individuals (Willems & van Schaik, 2015). When action is joint, we should not 58 
regard social groups as monolithic units, but instead as complex systems composed of selfish entities 59 
(Arrow, McGrath, & Berdahl, 2000). The patterns of cooperative behaviour observed at the group level 60 
are an emergent property, which arise because of the individual benefits gained through participation 61 
and the social incentives exchanged among group members.  62 
Individual benefits are gained in the process of producing the public good; conversely, social 63 
incentives are benefits that are bestowed on cooperative individuals by their fellow group members (Fig. 64 
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1). Cooperative individuals may gain individual benefits when they have priority of access to the public 65 
good or when group members are close kin. In the context of BG conflicts, high-ranking individuals 66 
may gain asymmetric benefits and therefore be more likely to participate than other group members (S. 67 
A. Altmann, 1962). Participants may gain inclusive fitness benefits via kin selection (Hamilton, 1964), 68 
or BG aggression may serve to protect close relatives. Social incentives can be used to directly coerce 69 
group members into cooperating, or cooperative individuals may benefit indirectly by improving their 70 
reputation with group members (Alexander, 1987; Glowacki & Wrangham, 2013; Zahavi, 1975). Two 71 
potential reputation mechanisms are social prestige and image score, and BG aggression may be used to 72 
build reputation with potential coalition partners or potential mates. For the latter to be feasible, females 73 
must be able to exert female choice, such that males compete with each other to impress choosy females; 74 
this may be the case in multimale groups, or when females are able to transfer between groups in order 75 
to access preferred males. In the case of social prestige, participation in BG conflicts functions as an 76 
honest and costly signal of genetic quality (Zahavi, 1975). Alternatively, reputation based on image 77 
score assumes only that participation in BG conflicts makes the participant a more valued group member 78 
(Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Determining the relative importance of these various 79 
individual benefits and social incentives in driving participation in BG conflicts will provide new 80 
insights into a major question in behavioural ecology: given the selective benefits of cheating, how 81 
could cooperation evolve, and how is it maintained? 82 
In this paper, we focus on identifying the mechanisms driving male participation in BG conflicts 83 
in wild vervet monkeys, Chlorocebus aethiops pygerythrus. Vervet monkeys live in multimale 84 
multifemale groups and members of both sexes are active in BG conflicts. Although females are smaller 85 
than males, both sexes can initiate BG aggression and, in rare cases, physically attack members of 86 
opposing groups. Vervet monkeys are a highly suitable species for investigating individual variability in 87 
BG aggression as usually only a handful of group members are active in a given BG conflict, and 88 
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participation is highly variable both within and between individuals. Male BG aggression is particularly 89 
interesting because males may gain a variety of selective benefits from it (Fashing, 2001). Males are the 90 
dispersing sex in vervet monkeys, and, as a result, kinship benefits are more likely through parental care 91 
than kin selection (Fig. 1). Although offspring defence has primarily been seen in species that exhibit 92 
infanticide (Grinnell, Packer, & Pusey, 1995; Kitchen, 2004), BG conflicts can result in infant mortality 93 
in this species (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1987), which indicates that offspring defence could provide fitness 94 
benefits to males. Because male fitness is limited by access to receptive females (Trivers, 1972), and 95 
male vervet monkeys often try to prevent immigration of other males, mate defence may be an important 96 
individual benefit (Cheney, 1981). If so, then males with priority of access to mating opportunities (e.g. 97 
high-ranking males) should be more likely to exhibit BG aggression (Cooper, Aureli, & Singh, 2004; 98 
Kitchen, 2004). If males, in defending mates, also end up defending food resources as a by-product, they 99 
are said to act as ‘Hired Guns’ (Fashing, 2001; R. Wrangham & Rubenstein, 1986). Males may also 100 
directly defend food resources to increase the reproductive output of their mates (Williams, Oehlert, 101 
Carlis, & Pusey, 2004), a potentially beneficial strategy since resource availability has been linked to 102 
infant survival in vervet monkeys (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1987; Lee & Hauser, 1998). Alternatively, males 103 
may use BG aggression to enhance their reputation with choosy females, and subsequently increase their 104 
mating success. Moderate sexual dimorphism, female choice (Struhsaker, 1967) and the presence of 105 
multiple males in a group indicate that there is the potential for reputation effects in this species. 106 
Because male vervet monkeys do not form coalitions, we do not expect males to use BG aggression as a 107 
means to build their reputation with potential coalition partners. Similarly, we are unaware of any 108 
nonhuman studies showing that rewards and/or punishment are used to manipulate participation in BG 109 
conflicts.  110 
The aim of this study was to identify the causes of within- and between-individual variability in 111 
BG aggression, in order to determine the relative importance of the various mechanisms driving male 112 
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participation in BG conflicts. Although many studies have identified variation in the benefits gained by 113 
males and females (Fashing, 2001; Kitchen, 2004, 2006; Van Belle, 2015; Van Belle, Garber, Estrada, & 114 
Di Fiore, 2014), uncovering variability in the selective benefits promoting BG aggression within and 115 
between individuals of the same age–sex class has proven more difficult. We are unaware of any studies 116 
that show clear evidence that multiple mechanisms are at work within a sex. This lack of evidence may 117 
be because only a single selective benefit motivates individuals in many species, or because a different 118 
methodological approach is necessary to detect variability when it does exist. Previous studies have 119 
typically analysed whether individuals have, or have not, exhibited aggression during BG conflicts (e.g., 120 
Cooper et al., 2004; Fashing, 2001; Harris, 2010). However, there may be several acts of BG aggression 121 
within a single BG conflict, and because such an approach pools all of these, it inherently treats these 122 
independent acts as a homogeneous phenomenon. Doing so may mask within- and between-individual 123 
variability in the selective benefits of BG aggression. Alternatively, if within- or between-individual 124 
variability does exist, then acts of BG aggression may be motivated by different selective benefits, and 125 
the context surrounding each act of BG aggression may provide insight into what those selective benefits 126 
are.  127 
To test this supposition, we collected detailed observations of male participation in naturally 128 
occurring BG conflicts in a wild population of vervet monkeys. Using this data set, we identified four 129 
context-specific types of BG aggression exhibited by males: (1) defensive aggression, in response to BG 130 
aggression by the opposing group; (2) repelling prospecting males, which was the act of chasing away 131 
extragroup males that engaged in neutral (e.g. sitting in close proximity) or affiliative (e.g. grooming or 132 
playing) interactions with group members; (3) proactive aggression, which was BG aggression without a 133 
female leader or partner; (4) supporting female instigators, which was when males followed/supported a 134 
female leader in initiating BG aggression.  135 
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In this paper, we first examine male participation during BG conflicts as has typically been done 136 
in previous studies, treating BG aggression as a homogeneous phenomenon. Second, we examine BG 137 
aggression in each of the four contexts (defensive aggression, repelling prospectors, proactive 138 
aggression and supporting female instigators) to determine whether such an approach can provide 139 
further insight into the relative importance of the various selective benefits that may drive male 140 
participation. If any type of BG aggression serves to protect offspring, we predict that it would primarily 141 
be exhibited when there are (more) infants in the group, and by males that were likely to be sires of 142 
those infants. If males exhibit BG aggression to defend mates, we predict that this type of aggression 143 
would be exhibited predominantly by high-ranking males and be more common in the mating season. If 144 
BG aggression of any type functions as food defence, we predict that it would primarily be exhibited in 145 
seasons when defensible resources are abundant. Last, if males use a given type of BG aggression to 146 
build their reputation with female group members, we would expect this type of aggression to be 147 
exhibited primarily during the mating season, and that males that frequently exhibit this type of BG 148 
aggression should subsequently experience greater mating success.    149 
 150 
 151 
METHODS 152 
Subjects and Study Site 153 
Data were collected on three habituated groups of vervet monkeys at the Mawana Game Reserve 154 
(28°00’S, 31°12’E), KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Groups consisted of 30–56 individuals and the 155 
number of adult males per group ranged from one to seven over the study period. All animals in the 156 
three focal groups were individually recognized, as were most of the adults in four neighbouring and 157 
frequently encountered groups.  158 
8 
 
The 22 sampled males were classified as belonging to four different career stages (van 159 
Noordwijk & van Schaik, 1988) based on their rank and probability of having sired offspring at the time 160 
of each BG conflict. Matings were recorded on an all-occurrence basis (J. Altmann, 1974), and although 161 
low-ranking males did attempt to mate out of sight of the dominant male, the open habitat and frequent 162 
terrestrial behaviour of the vervet monkeys meant that matings by both dominant and subordinate males 163 
were easily observed by researchers. Thus, the observed matings should be an unbiased sample of the 164 
matings that each male actually obtained. For each of the study groups, we calculated the proportion of 165 
the observed matings obtained by each male in a given mating season, and classified males having more 166 
than 20% of the matings as likely sires. Although we did not use genetic analyses to verify paternity in 167 
this study, there is no evidence for paternal kin recognition in this species; therefore, the behavioural 168 
proxy we used (i.e. the number of matings males procured, relative to other males in their group) most 169 
faithfully represents the information on potential paternity available to the males themselves. Our 20% 170 
cutoff was based on the median value of the proportions of matings observed for all males. The mean 171 
percentage of matings procured by males below the 20% cutoff was 7%. On average there were 2.2 172 
males (range 1–3) that were deemed likely sires in each group in a given year, and up to five males with 173 
a low probability of having sired offspring (<20% of observed matings). Likely sires were further 174 
subdivided into dominant likely sires if they were the alpha male, and subordinate likely sires if they 175 
were a subordinate male at the time of the BG conflict. Lastly, uninvested males were subordinate males 176 
that had not achieved high mating success in their present group.  177 
To determine whether residency time influenced male BG aggression, we also classified males as 178 
being recent immigrants if they had joined their respective groups within the 60 days preceding the BG 179 
conflict. This was the maximum length of time that males took to integrate into their group. Similarly, 180 
males that would leave their respective groups within the 60 days following the BG conflict were 181 
deemed future emigrants.   182 
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 183 
Behavioural Data Collection  184 
Behavioural observations were made between January 2012 and February 2014. Groups were followed 185 
an average of 6.5 h per day, 5 days per week, for a total of >11 000 observation hours. Participation in 186 
BG conflicts was recorded on an all-occurrence basis (J. Altmann, 1974). Because concurrent 187 
experimental research employed provisioning (van de Waal, Borgeaud, & Whiten, 2013), we excluded 188 
from our analyses all BG conflicts occurring on days that provisioning had occurred. We defined the 189 
onset of a BG encounter when two groups approached within 100 m of each other or initiated vocal 190 
interactions over larger distances. At the onset of a BG encounter we recorded the time and the location 191 
with a handheld GPS unit (Garmin GPSMAP64, Garmin Ltd). Throughout the BG conflict we recorded 192 
all participation events for each individual in the focal group and also noted the participation of the 193 
opposing group’s members whenever possible. Between-group encounters were deemed BG conflicts 194 
when one or more individuals from either group exhibited aggression to the opposing group. For each 195 
aggressive participation event, we recorded the identity of active individuals, the identity of the 196 
individual that initiated/led the event, behaviour(s) exhibited, identity of the target individuals (or their 197 
sex and age class when their identity was unknown), and whether the aggressive behaviour was 198 
proactive (initiated by the focal group) or reactive (in response to aggression by the opposing group). 199 
Aggressive behaviours could be directed towards the opposing group as a whole (e.g. running at the 200 
group or making aggressive displays and/or vocalizations) or target specific individuals (e.g. chasing or 201 
biting).  202 
 203 
GPS Data and Home Range Estimation  204 
Previous studies have shown that individuals are more likely to exhibit aggression closer to the centre of 205 
their home range or in intensely used areas, and as a result groups are more likely to win conflicts in 206 
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these locations (Crofoot & Gilby, 2012; Markham, Alberts, & Altmann, 2012). To account for this 207 
potentially confounding effect of location, we determined both the distance from each BG conflict 208 
location to the home range centre and the long-term intensity of use. We deployed a GPS collar (e-obs 209 
Type 1C light, e-obs GmbH) on one adult female in each group, and programmed it to obtain GPS-fixes 210 
every 30 min, from 0500 to 1900 hours, between March 2013 and February 2014. Over this period, 211 
utilization distributions were estimated for each group using the Brownian bridge movement model 212 
(Horne, Garton, Krone, & Lewis, 2007) as implemented by (Buchin, Sijben, Arseneau, & Willems, 213 
2012) in R (version 3.0.2, R Core Team, 2014). Fixes from the beginning, and end, of the day that were 214 
within 50 m of the start, and finish, locations, were censored to restrict our calculations to the diurnal 215 
activity period of the animals. After estimating the utilization distribution, we used the 99% isopleth to 216 
delineate home range boundaries, and from this calculated the home range centroid. For each BG 217 
conflict location, we determined the local intensity of use from the estimated utilization distribution, and 218 
the distance to the home range centroid. Intensity of use values were reciprocal-log transformed in order 219 
to stabilize our statistical models and ensure convergence of maximum-likelihood parameter estimates. 220 
Although we did not have GPS location data across the entire study period, the observed range use of all 221 
three focal groups was stable between years. Thus, areas of higher intensity of use in the period with 222 
active GPS loggers suitably represented the longer-term value of an area for the purpose of this study.  223 
 224 
Habitat Productivity  225 
As an index of local habitat productivity, we calculated monthly average normalized difference 226 
vegetation index (NDVI) values from the MODIS MCD43A4 data set (version 5, processed by NASA’s 227 
LP DAAC (NASA Land Processes Distributed Active Archive Center (LP DAAC), 2014) and 228 
redistributed by WAMIS at http://wamis.meraka.org/za/). The NDVI is a well-established proxy of the 229 
amount and vigour of green vegetation, and strongly correlates with field measurements of food 230 
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availability and shelter in vervet monkeys (Willems, Barton, & Hill, 2009). Over the study period, 231 
monthly average NDVI values ranged from 0.25 to 0.67 with larger values indicating denser and more 232 
photosynthetically active vegetation.  233 
 234 
Statistical Analyses 235 
We included male career stage and residency status as independent factors in our analyses of BG 236 
aggression. We also included four seasonal factors (the onset of the birth season, number of infants, 237 
seasonal resource abundance and mating season), the intensity of use of the BG conflict location, 238 
distance to the home range centre and the asymmetry in group size as independent factors. The first 239 
infants were typically born in September or October. We included the first month of the birth season (30 240 
days following the first birth in the group: yes or no) in our analyses to test whether males were more 241 
aggressive when they first became likely sires. We defined the number of infants in the group as the 242 
number of individuals less than 3 months old. Monthly NDVI values were included as a proxy of 243 
seasonal resource (food and shelter) abundance (Willems et al., 2009), with above-average NDVI values 244 
typically occurring between December and May. We classified the mating season as months in which 245 
the average mating rate was greater than two matings per 100 observation hours (April to August 2012; 246 
April to July 2013). Last, because previous studies have shown that individuals may modulate their 247 
participation in BG conflicts according to the relative fighting ability of their group, being active 248 
primarily when their group is outnumbered and their participation is most needed (Heinsohn & Packer, 249 
1995; Kitchen, 2006), we also considered the effect that asymmetry in group size had on male 250 
participation. Relative group size was defined as the relative number of adults and subadults in the focal 251 
group minus the number in the opposing group. We included adults and subadults as these were the two 252 
age classes that typically participated aggressively during BG conflicts.  253 
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All statistical analyses were conducted in R (version 3.0.3, R Core Team, 2014) using the lme4 254 
package (version 1.1-4, Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) and nlme packages (version 3.1-113, 255 
Pinheiro & Bates, 2014). In our first analysis, we built a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) to test 256 
the relative importance of the various independent factors (e.g. male career stage, residency, season, 257 
location and relative group size) in explaining whether or not males behaved aggressively during BG 258 
conflicts. In this first analysis, all aggressive acts were treated as a homogeneous phenomenon as we did 259 
not take into account the context in which they occurred. In our second set of analyses we used four 260 
separate GLMMs to investigate which factors influenced whether males (1) exhibited defensive 261 
aggression, (2) repelled prospecting males, (3) exhibited proactive aggression or (4) supported female 262 
instigators during BG conflicts.  263 
In all GLMMs the response variable was binary, and we therefore set a binomial error structure 264 
and logit link function in our models. We included male identity nested within group as random effects 265 
in all models to account for repeated sampling of individuals (Zuur, Ieno, Walker, Saveliev, & Smith, 266 
2009).  When we tested the effect of male career stage, uninvested males were always coded as the 267 
reference category. When both dominant and subordinate likely sires showed a similar pattern of 268 
behaviour, but one showed a significant effect and the other only a trend, we pooled all sires, regardless 269 
of their rank, and reran the model to determine the overall  effect of being a likely father (in each case, 270 
both models are presented in the Appendix). Doing so had very little effect on parameter estimates.  271 
We tested the significance of five interaction terms (male career stage * month following first 272 
birth, male career stage * number of infants, male career stage * monthly average NDVI, male career 273 
stage * mating season, and number of infants * relative group size) in each GLMM with likelihood ratio 274 
tests (χ2 test statistic), comparing the model with only main effects included to the model with each 275 
interaction included (Bolker et al., 2009; Zuur et al., 2009). Interactions that did not improve model fit at 276 
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the significance level of α = 0.1 were not retained in the final model. In all analyses, α was set at 0.05, 277 
but we briefly discuss nonsignificant trends (P < 0.10) when they are biologically interesting. 278 
To test whether any of the four types of BG aggression were related to male mating success, we 279 
used linear mixed-effects models (LMMs). We tested whether the proportion of BG conflicts in which 280 
males exhibited each aggression type (between January and the end of the mating season) correlated 281 
with their subsequent mating success that year. We excluded males that immigrated at the end of the 282 
mating season (were not present for at least three BG conflicts) from these analyses. The response 283 
variable, individual daily mating rate, was arcsine-square-root transformed prior to analysis, and we 284 
included individual male identity nested within group as a random effect (Zuur et al., 2009). 285 
We based our inferences on full models (plus important interaction effects) rather than using a 286 
stepwise procedure to avoid false positives and biased effect size estimates (Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 287 
2011). Following statistical convention we did not interpret main effects if the predictor variable 288 
featured in a significant interaction effect. The overall significance of each GLMM was assessed by 289 
comparing the final model to the null model (model including intercept and random effects only) using a 290 
likelihood ratio test, while the total variance explained (R
2
GLMM(c)) was estimated following the method 291 
described by Nakagawa and Schielzeth (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). For LMM models, we present 292 
the marginal rather than conditional R
2
LMM because we were only interested in the variance explained by 293 
the fixed effects.  294 
 295 
Ethical Note 296 
All data collection protocols were approved by local and national authorities, as well as the Ezemvelo 297 
KZN Wildlife Ethics Board in South Africa. In the course of this study period we trapped nine adult 298 
females in the three main study groups in order to outfit each with a GPS collar. We modified the 299 
trapping method used by Grobler and Turner (Grobler & Turner, 2010) so that researchers could use a 300 
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rope to trigger the trap and target the desired individual (i.e. an adult female). Once captured, females 301 
were tranquillized with ketamine, weighed, and a GPS collar fitted before they were released. After 302 
being released in a shady and covered location, females were observed until they had recovered and 303 
returned to their group. The weight of GPS collars was 120 g, which is equivalent to approximately 3% 304 
of the body weight of the smallest adult female that we collared. GPS collars were active for 4–5 months 305 
before the battery failed; thus, we deployed GPS collars onto three females in each of the three groups to 306 
obtain 1 year of continuous movement data.  307 
 308 
 309 
RESULTS 310 
In total we observed more than 400 BG encounters, half of which escalated into a BG conflict. We 311 
restricted our analyses to a subset of 126 BG conflicts in which all independent factors were known. On 312 
average, an individual male was only aggressive in a quarter of the BG conflicts that his group 313 
experienced, but participation was highly variable among the 22 males (mean proportion of encounters ± 314 
SD: 0.25 ± 0.20; Fig. 2). The most frequently observed types of aggression were defensive aggression 315 
(0.08 ± 0.12), repelling prospecting males (0.06 ± 0.08) and supporting instigator females (0.10 ± 0.10). 316 
Conversely, males rarely initiated proactive aggression without a female partner (0.03 ± 0.05).  317 
 318 
Treating Acts of BG Aggression as Homogeneous 319 
In our first analysis, in which we did not differentiate between acts of BG aggression within BG 320 
conflicts, we found that male career stage was an important predictor of male BG aggression. Dominant 321 
likely sires were more likely to behave aggressively during BG conflicts than uninvested males 322 
(subordinate males that were unlikely to have sired offspring), particularly when there were more infants 323 
in the group (Fig. 3a, Table A1). Subordinate likely sires showed a similar pattern of participation, but 324 
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the interaction term just failed to reach statistical significance (Fig. 3a, Table A1). However, when we 325 
pooled all likely sires, regardless of their rank, an overall positive interaction between the number of 326 
infants in the group and being a likely sire was apparent (Table A2). Males were more likely to be 327 
aggressive in the first month of the birth season than during the rest of the year (Table A2), and males 328 
tended to exhibit BG aggression more if there were infants in the group and their group was at a 329 
numerical disadvantage (Fig. 3b, Table A2). Alternatively, when there were infants in the group and 330 
their group was at a numerical advantage, males were the least active in BG conflicts. Thus, males, and 331 
likely sires in particular, appeared to be sensitive to the risk that BG conflicts posed to probable 332 
offspring. Males that had recently immigrated tended to participate in BG conflicts less frequently than 333 
other males (Table A2). We detected no effect of seasonal resource abundance, mating season, the 334 
annual intensity of use of the conflict location or the distance to the home range centre on the probability 335 
that males were aggressive during BG conflicts (Table A2).  336 
 337 
Context 1: Defensive BG Aggression  338 
In our second set of analyses, we classified acts of BG aggression into four categories according to the 339 
context in which the aggression was exhibited. We found that likely sires were more likely to exhibit 340 
defensive BG aggression, although dominant and subordinate likely sires did not show the same strength 341 
of response. Subordinate likely sires were more likely to reactively defend their group members than 342 
uninvested males, while dominant likely sires showed only a tendency to do the same (Table A3). 343 
However, when we pooled all likely sires, regardless of their rank, we found that a high likelihood of 344 
paternity was associated with higher frequencies of defensive aggression (Table A4). In contrast, 345 
dominant males without a high likelihood of paternity showed no greater tendency to exhibit defensive 346 
aggression than did uninvested males (Table A4). Males used defensive aggression independent of 347 
season, location and relative group size (Table A4). 348 
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 349 
Context 2: Repelling Prospecting Males 350 
Dominant likely sires showed a stronger tendency to repel prospecting males than subordinate likely 351 
sires (Table A5) but overall, males that were likely sires were more likely to exhibit this type of BG 352 
aggression than uninvested males (Table A6).There was a weak tendency for males to exhibit BG 353 
aggression in this context during seasons of high resource abundance (Table A6). This was the time of 354 
year that BG conflicts were frequent and of a long duration, and therefore when males had the most 355 
opportunities to prospect. Males repelled prospecting males independent of the immigration status, 356 
season, location and relative group size (Table A6). 357 
 358 
Context 3: Proactive BG Aggression 359 
Proactive aggression was also more likely to be exhibited by likely sires than uninvested males, 360 
regardless of whether they were dominant or subordinate (Table A7). In contrast, dominant males 361 
without a high likelihood of paternity showed no greater tendency to exhibit proactive aggression than 362 
did uninvested males (Table A7). Between-group aggression in this context was rare (Fig. 2), but we 363 
never observed recent immigrants exhibiting proactive aggression. We found no significant season or 364 
location effects in this context, and relative group size was also unimportant (Table A7). 365 
 366 
Context 4: Supporting Female Instigators 367 
In the context of supporting female instigators, males showed different patterns of BG aggression than 368 
they did in the other three contexts. Importantly, males were significantly more likely to support female 369 
instigators during the mating season than other times of year (Tables A8, A9). We also found a 370 
significant interaction between male career stage and resource abundance, indicating that dominant 371 
males tended to start supporting female instigators 2–3 months prior to the onset of the mating season, as 372 
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this is the time when NDVI values tended to be greater than 0.5 (Fig. 4, Table A9). This tendency, 373 
however, was weaker for dominant likely sires than dominant unlikely sires (Fig. 4, Table A8). We 374 
detected no significant effect of the number of infants in the group, location or relative group size (Table 375 
A9). There was a weak tendency for males to exhibit this type of aggression during the first month of the 376 
birth season (Table A9). 377 
 378 
Male BG Aggression and Subsequent Mating Success 379 
We found that the propensity to exhibit BG aggression in all four contexts was at least weakly associated 380 
with subsequent mating success (Fig. 5). However, only BG aggression in the context of supporting 381 
female instigators showed a strong correlation; the frequency that individual males exhibited this type of 382 
BG aggression explained approximately a third of the variability in male mating success (LMM: 383 
R
2
LMM(m) = 0.28, t = 3.28, P = 0.008; Fig 5d). Furthermore, BG aggression to support female instigators 384 
explained almost twice as much variation in the subsequent mating success of individual males than did 385 
exhibiting defensive aggression (R
2
LMM(m) = 0.15, t = 2.23, P = 0.050; Fig. 5a), repelling prospectors 386 
(R
2
LMM(m) = 0.14, t = 0.053, P = 0.053; Fig. 5b) or proactive aggression (R
2
LMM(m) = 0.15, t = 2.26, P = 387 
0.047; Fig. 5c). We observed relatively low mating skew such that on average there were 2.2 males per 388 
group that obtained >20% of the matings in a given year. Thus, the observed relationship between 389 
supporting female instigators and individual mating success was not simply a dominance effect, as there 390 
were usually one or two subordinate males that were relatively successful in obtaining mating 391 
opportunities. 392 
 393 
 394 
DISCUSSION 395 
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The aim of this study was to determine the relative importance of various individual benefits and social 396 
incentives in modulating male aggression during BG conflicts. By considering the social and ecological 397 
context surrounding each act of BG aggression, we found evidence for two selective benefits of male 398 
participation in BG conflicts. Our findings suggest that likely sires employed an offspring defence 399 
strategy, and that reputation effects probably promote male support of female instigators during and just 400 
prior to the onset of the mating season. We found little evidence that males fight in BG conflicts to 401 
directly defend food or mates, and, unlike other studies (e.g., Crofoot, Gilby, Wikelski, & Kays, 2008; 402 
Markham et al., 2012), we detected no effect of location.   403 
 404 
Evidence for Offspring Defence 405 
When we examined BG aggression as a homogeneous behavioural phenomenon, we found that likely 406 
sires were those most likely to participate in BG conflicts, indicating that offspring protection may be an 407 
important selective benefit of male BG aggression in vervet monkeys. Males were more likely to exhibit 408 
BG aggression when there were (more) infants present, and when being at a numerical disadvantage 409 
could increase the risk of injury or death for group members (Mosser & Packer, 2009; Sillero-Zubiri & 410 
Macdonald, 1998). In many of the BG conflicts that we observed, the group that was at a numerical 411 
disadvantage made little attempt to defend a given location, and fled as the larger group approached. On 412 
numerous occasions we observed that small infants were at risk of being left behind, presumably when 413 
they had strayed too far from their mothers and could not be collected quickly as the group fled. When 414 
left behind, infants were attacked by members of the opposing group; as has also been reported in other 415 
studies (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1987), these attacks could result in death. To mitigate this risk, males from 416 
numerically inferior groups often ran to meet the opposing group and exhibited defensive aggression, 417 
seemingly to ensure that their fleeing group members escaped safely. Conversely, the reduced need for 418 
males in larger groups to respond defensively may explain why we found that males in numerically 419 
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superior groups were less likely to participate aggressively during BG conflicts when there were infants 420 
in the group. Together, anecdotal and empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that escalated BG 421 
conflicts pose a risk to potential offspring, such that likely sires may gain fitness benefits by acting as 422 
protective parents.  423 
Males often chase away extragroup males that are attempting to affiliate with group members 424 
during BG encounters, and this tendency has been cited as evidence for mate defence in vervet monkeys 425 
(Cheney, 1981). Because dominant males typically experienced the greatest mating success, we 426 
expected that they, rather than likely sires, would exhibit aggression in this context if prospecting males 427 
were perceived primarily as mating competitors. However, we found it was likely sires that were most 428 
likely to repel prospecting males, suggesting that the latter are not perceived as future competition, but 429 
rather as a threat to potential offspring. Anecdotally, prospecting males were often tolerated in close 430 
proximity for long periods, and curious juveniles were those most likely to approach closely and interact 431 
with them. It was often after a conflict between juveniles and prospecting males that the latter were 432 
chased away.  433 
Previous evidence of offspring defence has primarily been found in species with high paternity 434 
certainty and frequent infanticide (e.g., Kitchen, 2004; Wich, Assink, & Sterck, 2004). To our 435 
knowledge, our results are the first to indicate that male BG aggression can function as paternal care in a 436 
species with multimale groups and low paternity certainty. In the absence of kin recognition, males may 437 
evaluate their probability of paternity based on their past mating success (Moscovice et al., 2010), and 438 
when BG conflicts pose a threat to offspring survival, males may gain fitness benefits by defending 439 
likely offspring, even in the face of paternity uncertainty.  440 
 441 
Evidence for Mate Defence 442 
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The only context in which we saw a significant mating season effect was in supporting female 443 
instigators. While this finding may superficially seem to support a mate defence strategy, it is unlikely 444 
given other evidence. If male aggression during the mating season provided an individual benefit, we 445 
would expect that males would be equally as likely to exhibit this type of aggression without a female 446 
partner; however, proactive BG aggression was extremely rare, and did not show the same seasonal 447 
pattern. Thus, it seems likely that an alternative mechanism can better explain this mating season effect.  448 
 449 
Evidence for Food Defence 450 
Resource availability, as indexed by NDVI, had a significant influence on the participation of dominant 451 
males in the context of supporting female instigators. Again, given that proactive BG aggression was 452 
rare, and did not show the same seasonal pattern, it is unlikely that dominant males exhibit this type of 453 
aggression to defend food directly, and that an alternative explanation is required for this interaction 454 
term. 455 
 456 
Evidence for a Reputation Effect 457 
We found a significant effect of mating season on the tendency of males to support female instigators. 458 
Furthermore, dominant males tended to start exhibiting this type of BG aggression a few months in 459 
advance of the mating season. This period (i.e. approximately December to February) is typically 460 
characterized by the presence of high-quality fruits and high NDVI values, and is when females were 461 
most active in BG conflicts. Given that males that displayed this type of BG aggression were following 462 
female leaders, and therefore cooperating with females to defend valuable resources, there is a strong 463 
possibility that this type of BG aggression is motivated by social incentives rather than individual 464 
benefits. Indirect social incentives (i.e. reputation effects) are a feasible mechanism for promoting male 465 
participation in BG conflicts in this species because of the extent to which females can choose their 466 
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mating partners. Females were often observed to refuse matings with both dominant and subordinate 467 
males, regardless of differences in body size. Some males were frequently denied copulations, while 468 
others were almost never refused, indicating that females have preferences among male group members. 469 
Furthermore, male mating success was strongly related to the proportion of BG conflicts in which they 470 
had supported female instigators. Together, these findings suggest that males probably support females 471 
in fighting for valuable resources as a means of building a good reputation, the benefits of which can be 472 
reaped during the subsequent mating season.  In species wherefemales are able to use social incentives 473 
to exert leverage over males, cooperation may be sexually selected for through female preferences for 474 
cooperative males, and males would more accurately be characterized as ‘Reluctant Recruits’ than 475 
‘Hired Guns’.  476 
Although other authors have previously proposed that males may use participation in BG 477 
conflicts as a means of building their reputation with female group members (Fashing, 2001; Steenbeek, 478 
1999), we present the first evidence, outside of humans, that BG aggression can be associated with 479 
increased mating success (Chagnon, 1988; Glowacki & Wrangham, 2015; Glowacki & Wrangham, 480 
2013). To further delineate which reputation mechanism best explains the patterns of behaviour 481 
observed in vervet monkeys (i.e. social prestige versus image score), future studies would have to 482 
determine whether male BG aggression is an honest signal of male quality (Bergmüller, Johnstone, 483 
Russell, & Bshary, 2007). 484 
In this study, we demonstrated that apparent food or mate defence is not easily interpreted in 485 
species with female choice. Similar caution should be taken in interpreting findings in species in which 486 
females can disperse to access preferred males, or in which group members form coalitions. In such 487 
cases, seasonal variability in participation could indicate either that BG aggression is driven by 488 
individual benefits, or that individuals fight in BG conflicts to improve their reputation with group 489 
members. When working on species in which reputation effects may influence BG aggression, it is 490 
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important to consider both the ecological and the social context in which individuals participate. Social 491 
context could be ‘with whom individuals cooperate’ during BG conflicts, as was examined in this study, 492 
or ‘whose presence’ influences individual participation (e.g., Meunier, Molina-Vila, & Perry, 2012). 493 
 494 
Elucidating Individual Variability by Considering Context  495 
Despite the important role that individual variability plays in overcoming collective action problems in 496 
theoretical models (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014), we are unaware of any study on BG conflict that 497 
illustrates that multiple selective benefits promote male BG aggression. In our first analysis, we did not 498 
differentiate between acts of aggression within BG conflicts; thus all acts of aggression were treated as a 499 
homogeneous phenomenon. With this approach, we only detected an offspring defence strategy, 500 
probably because it was the most frequently expressed mechanism. It was only when we partitioned acts 501 
of BG aggression according to context that we elucidated an alternative strategy, namely acting as a 502 
‘Reluctant Recruit’ in order to build a good reputation.  503 
If BG conflicts pose a risk to infants (as was observed in this study, as well as Cheney, 1987), 504 
escalating BG conflicts could have fitness consequences for males that are likely to have sired offspring. 505 
Indeed, we saw that likely sires were more likely to exhibit reactive aggression, becoming involved in 506 
the BG conflict only when the opposing group was being aggressive rather than initiating BG aggression 507 
themselves. Alternatively, failing to support females in instigating BG aggression could negatively 508 
influence their reputation, and they may experience lower mating success in the following mating season 509 
as a result. Thus, likely sires may face a trade-off between their future mating success and the safety of 510 
their current probable offspring.  Depending on their probability of paternity, the season and their ability 511 
to fight in BG conflicts, individual males probably experience a unique set of costs and benefits from 512 
participating or defecting. The observed ‘group behaviour’ in any given BG conflict emerges from the 513 
sum total of the decisions made by each individual group member. As a result, the public good of home 514 
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range defence can be produced by different individuals, in different seasons or even at different times 515 
within a single BG conflict. Our findings highlight that investigations of group level cooperation must 516 
quantify the various selective benefits that influence the decisions of all group members, and not only 517 
the selective benefit that is most frequently expressed. Collective action problems can pose a significant 518 
challenge to group level cooperation (Nunn & Lewis, 2001; Willems et al., 2013), and our study has 519 
advanced our understanding of the mechanisms by which collective action problems may be averted. 520 
However, a comprehensive examination of group level cooperation requires an understanding of not just 521 
the selective benefits driving male participation, but also female BG aggression, as well as the factors 522 
influencing the effectiveness of cooperation between group members with diverging interests. Such 523 
investigations will enrich our understanding of the mechanisms by which BG conflict exerts selective 524 
pressure on the evolution of cooperation in social species, including our own (Bowles, 2009; van Schaik, 525 
1983; R. W. Wrangham, 1980). 526 
 527 
 528 
 529 
 530 
 531 
 532 
 533 
 534 
 535 
 536 
 537 
 538 
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Figures 539 
 540 
Figure 1. Potential selective benefits of cooperation in a social group (white background) (adapted from 541 
Bshary & Bergmüller, 2008; Fashing, 2001; Nunn & Lewis, 2001) and associated reasons for male 542 
vervet monkeys’ participation in between-group conflicts (grey background). 543 
 544 
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 545 
Figure 2. Mean proportion of between-group conflicts in which males participated aggressively and 546 
exhibited each type of context-specific, between-group (BG) aggression. Error bars depict SD.  547 
 548 
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 549 
Figure 3. Probability of a male participating aggressively during between-group (BG) conflicts as a 550 
function of (a) the interaction between male career stage and number of infants in the group and (b) the 551 
interaction between relative group size and the number of infants in the group. Prediction lines were 552 
obtained by plotting GLMM predictions (Table A1), setting all additional predictor variables to their 553 
mean values. In (b), we averaged predicted probabilities across the four categories of male career stage 554 
to illustrate the expected probability of aggression for an average male in our population. 555 
 556 
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 557 
Figure 4. Probability that males supported female instigators during between-group conflicts, as a 558 
function of the interaction between male career stage and the monthly average NDVI values, a proxy of 559 
seasonal resource abundance. Prediction lines were obtained by plotting GLMM predictions (Table A8), 560 
setting all additional predictor variables to their mean values. 561 
 562 
28 
 
 563 
Figure 5. Linear mixed-effects models of the relationship between the proportion of between-group 564 
(BG) encounters that males (a) exhibited defensive aggression, (b) repelled prospectors, (c) exhibited 565 
proactive aggression and (d) supported female instigators and their subsequent mating success. Each 566 
male’s daily mating rates were arcsine-square-root transformed prior to analyses.  567 
 568 
 569 
 570 
 571 
 572 
 573 
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APPENDIX 760 
 761 
Table A1  762 
Factors affecting the probability that males were aggressive (aggression as a homogeneous phenomenon) during 763 
between-group conflicts, after nonsignificant interaction terms were removed from the model 764 
Fixed effects Estimate SE z P 
(Intercept) -1.23 1.36 - - 
Male career stage     
Uninvested males (reference category) - - - - 
Dominant unlikely sire  0.65 0.50 - - 
Subordinate likely sire  0.95 0.40 - - 
Dominant likely sire  0.35 0.45 - - 
Residency      
Immigrant -0.66 0.35 -1.86 0.064 
Emigrant  0.09 0.36  0.25 0.801 
Seasonal factors     
Month following first birth  1.39 0.57  2.43 0.015 
Number of infants -0.32 0.17 - - 
Seasonal habitat productivity  1.65 1.14  1.44 0.150 
Mating season  0.45 0.33  1.34 0.180 
Intensity of use -0.08 0.12 -0.65 0.514 
Distance to home range centre -0.03 0.05 -0.66 0.510 
Relative group size  0.03 0.05 - - 
Interactions     
Number of infants * Relative group size -0.03 0.02 -1.73 0.084 
Number of infants * Dominant unlikely sire  0.04 0.38  0.10 0.920 
Number of infants * Subordinate likely sire  0.38 0.21  1.76 0.079 
Number of infants * Dominant likely sire  0.50 0.20  2.43 0.015 
The final model was significantly different from the null model containing only an intercept term and individual 765 
nested in group as random effects (likelihood ratio test: N = 351, χ2 = 80.43, P < 0.001, R2GLMM(c) = 0.23). Male 766 
career stage was always compared to uninvested males as a reference category. The removed nonsignificant 767 
interactions were those between male career stage and whether it was the month following the first birth of the 768 
season or not (N = 351, χ2 = 0.91, P = 0.635), male career stage and seasonal habitat productivity (N = 351, χ2 = 769 
2.57, P = 0.463) and male career stage and mating season (N = 351, χ2 = 1.24, P = 0.742). Significant predictors 770 
are presented in bold and trends are italicized. 771 
  772 
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Table A2  773 
Factors affecting the probability that males were aggressive during between-group conflicts (aggression as a 774 
homogeneous phenomenon), with all likely sires pooled, regardless of their rank. 775 
Fixed effects Estimate SE z P 
(Intercept) -1.44 1.40 - - 
Male career stage     
Uninvested males (reference category) - - - - 
Dominant unlikely sire  0.59 0.53 - - 
All likely sires (pooled)   0.65 0.38 - - 
Residency      
Immigrant -0.70 0.36 -1.92 0.051 
Emigrant  0.10 0.37  0.27 0.787 
Seasonal factors     
Month Following first birth  1.38 0.58  2.37 0.018 
Number of infants -0.32 0.17 - - 
Seasonal habitat productivity  1.70 1.17  1.46 0.146 
Mating season  0.45 0.34  1.34 0.180 
Intensity of use -0.06 0.12 -0.49 0.622 
Distance to home range centre -0.03 0.05 -0.60 0.547 
Relative group size  0.05 0.05 - - 
Interactions      
Number of infants * Relative group size -0.03 0.02 -1.91 0.056 
Number of infants * Dominant unlikely sire  0.04 0.39   0.12 0.908 
Number of infants * All likely sires  0.43 0.19  2.26 0.024 
The final model was significantly different from the null model containing only an intercept term and individual 776 
nested in group as random effects (likelihood ratio test: N = 351, χ2 = 79.56, P < 0.001, R2GLMM(c) = 0.24). Male 777 
career stage was always compared to uninvested males as a reference category. Significant predictors are 778 
presented in bold and trends are italicized. 779 
 780 
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  786 
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Table A3  787 
Factors affecting the probability that males exhibited defensive (reactive) aggression to protect group members 788 
during between-group conflicts, after nonsignificant interaction terms were removed from the model 789 
Fixed effects Estimate SE z P 
(Intercept) -5.50 2.26 - - 
Male career stage     
Uninvested males (reference category) - - - - 
Dominant unlikely sire -0.24 0.82 -0.29 0.770 
Subordinate likely sire  1.14 0.55  2.07 0.038 
Dominant likely sire  1.11 0.60  1.83 0.067 
Residency      
Immigrant -0.00 0.56 -0.00 0.998 
Emigrant -0.02 0.56 -0.03 0.978 
Seasonal factors     
Month following first birth  0.32 0.78  0.41 0.685 
Number of infants  0.08 0.09  0.89 0.375 
Seasonal habitat productivity 1.66 1.89  0.88 0.380 
Mating season  0.27 0.53  0.52 0.607 
Intensity of use -0.12 0.22 -0.57 0.570 
Distance to home range centre  0.37 0.26  1.43 0.153 
Relative group size -0.02 0.08 -0.24 0.809 
The final model was significantly different from the null model containing only group and individual as random 790 
effects (likelihood ratio test: N = 345, χ2 = 23.15, P = 0.026, R2GLMM(c) = 0.53). Male career stage was always 791 
compared to uninvested males as a reference category. The removed nonsignificant interactions were those 792 
between male career stage and seasonal habitat productivity (N = 345, χ2 = 1.91, P = 0.591), male career stage 793 
and mating season (N = 345, χ2 = 4.66, P = 0.198) and relative group size and the number of infants (N = 345, χ2 = 794 
1.32, P = 0.251). The model failed to converge when the interactions between male career stage and the number 795 
of infants and male career stage and whether it was the month following the first birth of the season or not 796 
were included; therefore, we could not evaluate the significance of these interactions. Significant predictors are 797 
presented in bold and trends are italicized. 798 
 799 
 800 
  801 
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Table A4  802 
Factors affecting the probability that males exhibited defensive (reactive) aggression to protect group members 803 
during between-group conflicts, with all likely sires pooled 804 
Fixed effects Estimate SE z P 
(Intercept) -5.52 2.23 - - 
Male career stage     
Uninvested males (reference category) - - - - 
Dominant unlikely sire -0.24 0.82 -0.30  0.767 
All likely sires (pooled)   1.13 0.48  2.36 0.018 
Residency      
Immigrant -0.00 0.56 -0.00 0.997 
Emigrant  0.01 0.56  0.03 0.979 
Seasonal factors     
Month following first birth  0.32 0.77  0.41 0.679 
Number of infants  0.08 0.09  0.89 0.375 
Seasonal habitat productivity  1.68 1.87  0.90 0.371 
Mating season  0.27 0.53  0.52 0.604 
Intensity of use -0.13 0.21 -0.58 0.559 
Distance to home range centre  0.37 0.25  1.51 0.130 
Relative group size -0.02 0.07 -0.24 0.810 
The final model was significantly different from the null model containing only group and individual as random 805 
effects (likelihood ratio test: N = 345, χ2 = 23.15, P = 0.017, R2GLMM(c) = 0.53). Male career stage was always 806 
compared to uninvested males as a reference category. Significant predictors are presented in bold and trends 807 
are italicized. 808 
 809 
 810 
 811 
 812 
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 814 
 815 
 816 
  817 
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Table A5 818 
Factors affecting the probability that males repelled prospecting extragroup males during between-group 819 
conflicts, after nonsignificant interaction terms were removed from the model 820 
Fixed effects Estimate SE z P 
(Intercept) -3.81 2.41 - - 
Male career stage     
Uninvested males (reference category) - - - - 
Dominant unlikely sire  0.47 0.88  0.54 0.590 
Subordinate likely sire  1.15 0.66  1.75 0.080 
Dominant likely sire  1.71 0.65  2.64 0.008 
Residency      
Immigrant -1.29 0.83 -1.57 0.118 
Emigrant  0.48 0.62  0.78 0.438 
Seasonal factors     
Month following first birth -0.56 1.17 -0.48 0.632 
Number of infants -0.16 0.13 -1.23 0.220 
Seasonal habitat productivity  3.49 2.04  1.71 0.088 
Mating season -0.16 0.64 -0.24 0.809 
Intensity of use -0.05 0.21 -0.24 0.813 
Distance to home range centre -0.07 0.09 -0.74 0.459 
Relative group size  0.04 0.08  0.49 0.625 
The final model was significantly different from the null model containing only group and individual as random 821 
effects (likelihood ratio test: N = 351, χ2 = 34.64, P < 0.001, R2GLMM(c) = 0.26). Male career stage was always 822 
compared to uninvested males as a reference category. The removed nonsignificant interactions were those 823 
between male career stage and the number of infants (N = 351, χ2 = 1.21, P = 0.752), male career stage and 824 
seasonal habitat productivity (N = 351, χ2 = 1.32, P = 0.725), male career stage and mating season (N = 351, χ23 = 825 
1.70, P = 0.637) and relative group size and the number of infants (N = 351, χ2 = 0.02, P = 0.877). The model 826 
failed to converge when the interaction between male career stage and whether it was the month following the 827 
first birth of the season or not was included; therefore, we could not evaluate the significance of this term. 828 
Significant predictors are presented in bold and trends are italicized. 829 
 830 
 831 
 832 
  833 
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Table A6  834 
Factors affecting the probability that males repelled prospecting extragroup males during between-group 835 
conflicts, with all likely sires pooled 836 
Fixed effects Estimate SE z P 
(Intercept) -3.78 2.41 - - 
Male career stage     
Uninvested males (reference category) - - - - 
Dominant unlikely sire  0.50 0.88  0.57 0.566 
All likely sires (pooled)  1.42 0.56  2.51 0.012 
Residency      
Immigrant -1.28 0.83 -1.56 0.120 
Emigrant  0.42 0.62  0.68 0.494 
Seasonal factors     
Month following first birth -0.50 1.16 -0.43 0.666 
Number of infants -0.15 0.13 -1.19 0.236 
Seasonal habitat productivity  3.46 2.02  1.71 0.087 
Mating season -0.17 0.64 -0.27 0.786 
Intensity of use  -0.05 0.21 -0.23 0.819 
Distance to home range centre -0.07 0.09 -0.81 0.416 
Relative group size  0.02 0.07  0.22 0.827 
The final model was significantly different from the null model containing only group and individual as random 837 
effects (likelihood ratio test: N = 351, χ2 = 33.88, P < 0.001, R2GLMM(c) = 0.26). Male career stage was always 838 
compared to uninvested males as a reference category. Significant predictors are presented in bold and trends 839 
are italicized. 840 
 841 
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Table A7  849 
Factors affecting the probability that males exhibited proactive aggression (proactive aggression without a 850 
female partner) during between-group conflicts, after nonsignificant interaction terms were removed from the 851 
model 852 
Fixed effects Estimate SE z P 
(Intercept) -2.18 3.26 - - 
Male career stage     
Uninvested males (reference category) - - - - 
Dominant unlikely sire  1.78 1.47  1.21 0.226 
Subordinate likely sire  2.36 1.16  2.04 0.041 
Dominant likely sire  2.51 1.16  2.16 0.031 
Residency      
Immigrant - - - - 
Emigrant -0.57 1.15 -0.50 0.619 
Seasonal factors     
Month following first birth  0.78 0.92  0.86 0.392 
Number of infants  0.03 0.12  0.25 0.804 
Seasonal habitat productivity -1.81 3.09 -0.58 0.559 
Mating season -1.25 1.17 -1.07 0.283 
Intensity of use -0.06 0.31 -0.18 0.857 
Distance to home range centre -0.25 0.16 -1.61 0.108 
Relative group size  0.02 0.09  0.20 0.838 
The model failed to converge when the factor ‘Immigrant’ was included because recent immigrants were never 853 
seen to exhibit this type of aggression. The final model excluding ‘Immigrant’ was significantly different from the 854 
null model containing only group and individual as random effects (likelihood ratio test: N = 351, χ2 = 41.00, P < 855 
0.001, R2GLMM(c) = 0.50). Male career stage was always compared to uninvested males as a reference category. 856 
The interaction between relative group size and the number of infants was nonsignificant and was subsequently 857 
removed from the model (N = 351, χ21 = 0.20, P = 0.657). The model failed to converge when the interactions 858 
between male career stage and whether it was the month following the first birth of the season or not, male 859 
career stage and the number of infants, male career stage and seasonal habitat productivity and male career 860 
stage and mating season were included; therefore, we could not evaluate the significance of these interactions. 861 
Significant predictors are presented in bold and trends are italicized. 862 
 863 
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Table A8  865 
Factors affecting the probability that males supported female instigators during between-group conflicts, after 866 
nonsignificant interaction terms were removed from the model 867 
Fixed effects Estimate SE z P 
(Intercept)  0.32 2.58 - - 
Male career stage     
Uninvested males (reference category) - - - - 
Dominant unlikely sire -4.00 2.53 - - 
Subordinate likely sire  0.24 1.78 - - 
Dominant likely sire -2.65 2.01 - - 
Residency      
Immigrant -1.21 0.54 -2.23 0.026 
Emigrant  0.31 0.53  0.60 0.552 
Seasonal factors     
Month following first birth  1.43 0.86  1.66 0.098 
Number of infants -0.27 0.18 -1.52 0.129 
Seasonal habitat productivity -2.63 3.11 - - 
Mating season  1.41 0.50  2.80 0.005 
Intensity of use -0.30 0.22 -1.41 0.160 
Distance to home range centre  0.07 0.07  0.94 0.349 
Relative group size  0.06 0.06  1.04 0.299 
Interactions     
Habitat productivity * Dominant unlikely sire  11.69 5.09  2.30 0.022 
Habitat productivity * Subordinate likely sire  2.12 4.37  0.49 0.628 
Habitat productivity * Dominant likely sire  8.90 4.73  1.88 0.060 
The final model was significantly different from the null model containing only group and individual as random 868 
effects (likelihood ratio test: N = 340, χ2 = 65.38, P < 0.001, R2GLMM(c) = 0.38). Male career stage was always 869 
compared to uninvested males as a reference category. The removed nonsignificant interactions were those 870 
between male career stage and whether it was the month following the first birth of the season or not (N = 340, 871 
χ2 = 1.00, P = 0.601), male career stage and the number of infants in the group (N = 340, χ2 = 1.46, P = 0.692), 872 
male career stage and mating season (N = 340, χ2 = 4.23, P = 0.237) and relative group size and the number of 873 
infants (N = 340, χ2 = 0.00, P = 0.969). Significant predictors are presented in bold and trends are italicized. 874 
 875 
  876 
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Table A9  877 
Factors affecting the probability that males supported female instigators during between-group conflicts, with 878 
all dominant males pooled, regardless of their likelihood of paternity 879 
Fixed effects Estimate SE z P 
(Intercept)  0.31 2.59 - - 
Male career stage     
Uninvested males (reference category) - - - - 
All dominant males (pooled)  -3.22 1.74 - - 
Subordinate likely sire -0.15 1.76 - - 
Residency      
Immigrant -1.19 0.54 -2.22 0.026 
Emigrant  0.38 0.51  0.74 0.458 
Seasonal factors     
Month following first birth  1.48 0.86  1.74 0.083 
Number of infants -0.28 0.18 -1.56 0.118 
Seasonal habitat productivity -2.65 3.13 - - 
Mating season  1.42 0.50  2.85 0.004 
Intensity of use -0.31 0.22 -1.42 0.155 
Distance to home range centre  0.07 0.07  1.03 0.303 
Relative group size  0.05 0.06  0.84 0.403 
Interactions  0.07 0.06  1.11 0.269 
Habitat productivity * All dominant males   10.24 4.03  2.54 0.011 
Habitat productivity * Subordinate likely sire  2.21 4.39  0.50 0.614 
The final model was significantly different from the null model containing only group and individual as random 880 
effects (likelihood ratio test: N = 340, χ2 = 65.10, P < 0.001, R2GLMM(c) = 0.38). Male career stage was always 881 
compared to uninvested males as a reference category. Significant predictors are presented in bold and trends 882 
are italicized. 883 
